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Russia’s parliamentary election of December 2011 once more brought to global attention the role of 
electoral manipulation in that country’s political system. The methods of manipulation alleged in 
2011 are familiar from earlier elections. Most notably, the regional elections of October 2009 
resulted in an overwhelming victory for the ‘party of power’, United Russia, followed by a walk-out 
from the State Duma by the three other parliamentary parties, in protest at fraud and electoral 
manipulation. Multi-layered questions surround the role of electoral manipulation in Russia’s political 
system. Why would a regime which apparently still enjoys substantial popular support engage in 
electoral manipulation? In electorally authoritarian states elections constitute the central element of 
legitimacy. Although electoral manipulation helps secure power, it reduces legitimacy. The trade-off 
between legitimacy and power plays out in other levels too. The opacity of Russia’s political system 
obfuscates the behavioural drivers of other players. Regional leaders formally owe their positions to 
the President. If they feel obliged to deliver the correct electoral results, there is less clarity on what 
those results are, especially with the ‘tandem’ leadership of Medvedev and Putin sending out mixed 
signals on the nature of democracy in Russia. Opposition parties must weigh up the benefits of 
participating in flawed elections. The distinction between outright opposition, and ‘within regime’ 
semi-opposition again obfuscates. Participation in elections provides opposition with the opportunity 
to de-legimitise the regime, by highlighting electoral manipulation. For ‘within regime’ opposition, 
this opportunity must be weighed against the benefits of gaining some representation in legislatures, 
albeit at low levels and with no chance of real power. 
 
Introduction 
December 2011 saw the largest demonstrations in Moscow since the establishment of the 
Russian Federation in the early 1990s. Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched, with the 
permission of the ruling regime, to protest against what they claimed to be flawed elections marred 
by fraud. Although the scale of such demonstrations brought them to global attention, they were by 
no means the first such expression in recent years of anti-regime anger in the face of electoral 
malpractice. In particular, Russia’s regional elections in October 2009 were beset by allegations of 
procedural flaws and fraud. These sub-federal elections delivered a landslide victory to then Prime 
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Minister Vladimir Putin’s United Russia and led to the other parties in Russia’s lower chamber of 
parliament, the State Duma, walking out in protest. In the context of two decades of supposedly 
competitive elections in Russia, the events of October 2009 and December 2011 represent little 
new. The most detailed and forensic academic analysis to date of elections in post-Soviet Russia 
concluded, albeit tongue-in-cheek, that ‘If you had an election, you had fraud. The only question is: 
How much?’ (Myagkov et al. 2009: 2). Were ‘how much?’ really the only question, then the present 
analysis would be short, inconclusive and lacking in illuminative insight into the relationship between 
Russia’s political parties, electoral manipulation, and the political system. Indeed, whereas the 
quantitative question ‘how much?’ is extraordinarily difficult to answer with any great accuracy, a 
more qualitative analysis can consider a range of issues from the perspective of comparative 
electoral authoritarianism. From this standpoint the present article focuses on the regional elections 
of 11 October 2009 and their aftermath in order to shed light on the strategic options open to both 
regime and oppositional political parties, in a political system for which elections form the 
constitutive moment but remain ambiguous with regard to their formally essential role of providing 
the people with ‘an effective choice of political authorities among a community of free and equal 
citizens’ (Schedler 2002: 39). 
After setting out the events of October 2009 and following, this article considers the multi-
layered relationship between political parties and electoral manipulation in Russia from the 
perspective of Russia’s political system. Interestingly, President Medvedev himself chose to address 
the problems arising from the October 2009 elections within the framework of ‘developing the 
political system’ (Presidential website 2010).1 Whereas his approach was straightforward and linear 
– along the lines of ‘Russian democracy is making progress although there are still problems to be 
ironed out’ – the analysis here considers the functions of elections in the ‘actually existing 
democracy’ of contemporary Russia. For the regime, elections serve a legitimising role, for the 
opposition, flawed elections present an opportunity to delegitimise the regime. Functional 
difference leads to different responses on the part of the parties concerned. It is not so much that 
the electoral game is not being played on a level playing field, rather that different games are being 
played on the same playing field. Writing about electorally authoritarian regimes as a type, Andreas 
Schedler argues, drawing on George Tsebelis’ notion of ‘nested games’ (Tsebelis 1990), that 
‘strategic interaction within rules goes hand in hand with strategic competition over rules’ (Schedler 
2009).  
In the case of Russia’s disputed elections of October 2009, the ‘games’ are complicated 
further by several factors. The nature of opposition in Russia, as in many electorally authoritarian 
                                                          
1
 Translation from the Russian here and throughout are by the author. 
3 
 
regimes, represents a conceptual barrier, in that the ‘opposition’ parties in the State Duma manifest 
varying degrees of closeness to the ruling regime. Nor does the conceptualisation of regime versus 
opposition fully capture the complexity of elections, even were the nature of opposition to be clear 
cut. Regional authorities represent a third element in play. This is self-evident in regional elections, 
such as those in October 2009 on which this article focuses. However, the regional factor also comes 
strongly into play in national polls, such as the disputed parliamentary election of 2011 where five 
regions returned results giving ‘the party of power’, United Russia, over 90 per cent of the vote, as 
against its national average of 49 per cent.2 At the sub-federal level regional authorities are ‘regime’, 
but their own relationship with the federal authorities is not a straightforward one of subordination, 
rather it is a complex interaction of dependence, independence, and political signalling. The position 
of the regions has been obfuscated still further by the existence at the highest federal level of a 
‘tandem’ leadership, with the President’s formal superiority to the Prime Minister undermined by 
the powerful mix of formal and informal power enjoyed by Prime Minister Putin as a result of his 
former position as President, and the likelihood that he will return to that position in future. That 
Moscow, the federal capital, was one of the regions going to the polls in October 2009 exacerbates 
the analytically complex nature of the regime-opposition-region nexus. Moscow’s size and 
importance gave the electoral dispute a federal, and indeed international, profile. The power 
struggle between Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov and President Medvedev, which was to spill over in 
Luzhkov’s dismissal by Medvedev a year later, represents important context for a ‘thick’ 
understanding of the elections’ importance. Considering these issues, the present article illuminates 
the impact of Russia’s October 2009 regional elections, and specifically the accompanying disputes 
over electoral manipulation, on the development of Russia’s political system.  
 
Russia’s regional elections of October 2009 – an empirical overview 
Regional level elections took place in 12 of Russia’s 83 regions on 11 October 2009, which 
had been designated a ‘unified day of voting’ by the Central Electoral Commission. Until March 2006 
Russia’s regions had held their elections on different days. In 2005, however, in line with other 
legislation designed to centralise the electoral process, the State Duma designated the second 
Sunday in March and the second Sunday in October as the voting days for regional elections. In the 
same year, the parliament, at President Putin’s prompting, also abolished elections to the position of 
head of the regional executives, leaving only elections to legislatures at the regional level. Despite 
the term ‘unified day of voting’, in October 2009 of the 12 out of 83 regions holding regional level 
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 The republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Karachaevo-Cherkassiya, and Mordovia all returned votes 
of over 90 per cent for United Russia in the Duma elections of 2011. 
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elections, nine of these held by-elections only,3 leaving only three regions (the Republic of Mari El, 
Tula oblast’, and the city of Moscow) holding full elections to the regional legislature. Nonetheless, 
and largely due to the 10.5 million population of Moscow and the holding of municipal as well as 
regional elections, the number of regions within which some form of election was held amounted to 
75 and about a third of Russia’s population was eligible to vote on that day. The results of the three 
full regional legislature elections are set out in Table 1, in relation to the proportional representation 
element of the polls.4  
TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF PARTY LIST VOTE IN ELECTIONS FOR REGIONAL LEGISLATURES, 11 OCTOBER 2009 (%) 
Region Parties 
 Communist 

















 19.5  3.6  7.2  ---  --- 64.6  --- 
Moscow 
City 
 13.3  5.3  6.1  1.8  --- 66.3  4.7 
Tula 
Oblast 
 18.3  14.0  6.0  0.8  1.9 55.4  1.6 
Source: Central Electoral Commission, available at http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
(last accessed 19th December 2011) 
 
On 14 October the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the nationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, and the pro-Kremlin party, A Just Russia, staged a walkout from the 
State Duma in protest at what they claimed to be the rigging of elections in favour of Russia’s party 
of power, United Russia. The results in Moscow, where United Russia won 32 of 35 seats, with the 
Communists winning the remaining three, represented a source of particular anger. Some 135 
deputies participated in the walkout from the lower chamber of parliament. According to leading 
Communist Viktor Ilyukhin, the opposition parties formulated a series of demands, specifically a 
meeting between President Medvedev and representatives of the minority parties in the Duma, re-
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party list system, and Mari-El 52 seats which were divided equally, 26 decided by first-past-the-post and 26 by 




counts in several regions, a ban on the publication of full results until all suspect circumstances had 
been investigated, and the resignation of the head of the Central Electoral Commission, Vladimir 
Churov (Regions.Ru 2009).  
The response from the regime in 2009, as again in 2011, amounted to an insistence both 
that the elections were ‘generally fair’ (Levy 2009) and that the country’s leadership nonetheless 
took the complaints of the opposition seriously. Prime Minister Putin, who was – in the labyrinthine 
logic so suited to the opacity of Russia’s politics – leader of but not a member of United Russia, had 
reportedly warned party members ‘not to be too enthusiastic’ about the use of administrative 
resources at the regional level during the election (Borisov 2009). Without wishing to compare the 
magnitude of the events in question, there are echoes here of Stalin’s infamous Pravda article of 
March 1930, where he blamed overenthusiastic Party workers for getting ‘dizzy with success’ and 
pushing collectivisation too far, too fast: ‘... successes have their seamy side, especially when they 
are attained with comparative “ease”’ (Stalin 1930).  
In 2009 Putin, as he was to do again in December 2011, advised those with complaints on 
the conduct of the elections to provide proof and to open legal procedures (Borisov 2009, Russian 
Government website 2011). President Medvedev promised to meet with the Duma opposition 
leaders, which he did on 24 October 2009. By this time the parties had returned to the Duma – 
Liberal Democrats and A Just Russia on 16 October, and the Communists on 21 October. The Head of 
the Central Electoral Commission, Vladimir Churov, robustly defended the elections, though this is 
scarcely surprising for a man who readily admits, referring to himself by name in the third person, 
that ‘the first rule of Churov is that Putin is always right’ (Kolesnikov 2007). He had condemned the 
parliamentary démarche as politically motivated and designed to embarrass Russia during a high 
profile international visit (US Secretary of State Clinton was in Moscow at the time), and had 
declared that United Russia suffered from the decisions of the Central Electoral Commission more 
than any other party in the October elections (Rostovskii 2009). Nonetheless Churov had to endure 
highly critical questioning when he was summoned to the Duma to explain the conduct of elections.  
Following on from his informal meeting with the leaders of the parliamentary opposition on 
24 October (Presidential website 2009), President Medvedev met with them again on 16 January 
2010, ahead of the State Council meeting devoted to the development of the political system. 
Russia’s State Council does not have executive power, but is an advisory body, chaired by the 
president as head of state and made up of the heads of all of Russia’s federal regions (Bacon 2010a: 
101). At the State Council itself, Medvedev acknowledged that the electoral system remained 
imperfect, but stated that the allegations of fraud in the elections of October 2009 were unproven 
and that it was indisputable that ‘the results of regional elections reflect the real balance of political 
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forces in the country and public opinion’. Whilst lauding the fact that the number of formally 
oppositional factions in regional legislatures had risen from 91 in 2004 to 248 in 2009, Medvedev 
singled out Moscow City Duma as an example of a legislature with too limited a range of factions 
(specifically, two). He concluded by promising legislation to bring the threshold for representation in 
elections to regional legislatures down to 5 per cent, in line with national elections (Presidential 
website 2010).  
The next ‘unified day of voting’ in Russia took place on 14 March 2010, with some form of 
regional and municipal election being counducted in 76 of Russia’s 83 regions, and eight regions 
electing new legislatures.5 In all eight of these regions, as if taking their cue from President 
Medvedev’s State Council address, all four of the parties with seats in the State Duma won 
representation in the regional legislatures.  This goes some way to explaining the lack of concerted 
opposition reaction to alleged electoral manipulation in March 2010, as the instigators of the 
parliamentary démarche fared better in the elections. Nonetheless, allegations of electoral fraud 
remained widespread and were expressed openly again following the parliamentary elections of 
December 2011.  
The above empirical account of Russia’s regional elections in October 2009 and March 2010 
is lacking without one further element crucial to our analysis of the relationship between parties, 
electoral manipulation and the development of Russia’s political system. That element is the non-
parliamentary opposition. The parties involved in the parliamentary démarche of October 2009, 
whilst excluded from genuine power by the dominance of the Putin-Medvedev regime and the 
United Russia party, nonetheless can be seen as being ‘within system’, and indeed as ‘semi-
opposition’. Analysts differ as to the degree to which these parties represent genuine opposition, 
with some arguing that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation fits this category, whereas 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and A Just Russia are merely ‘loyal opposition’ or ‘virtual 
parties’ (Petrov et al. 2010: 10). Whatever the nuances between them, these parties with Duma 
representation have demonstrated varying degrees of closeness to the regime. Even their walkout 
from parliament in October 2009 was short-lived, and they returned with few of their demands met. 
Some observers suggested that the walkout itself occurred with the regime’s approval in order ‘to 
serve as a lightning rod for the high-voltage anger that this latest election fraud had generated, 
especially among grassroots activist  groups’ (Doukaev 2009). 
Beyond this parliamentary ‘semi-opposition’, the most prominent protesters about the 
conduct of the October 2009 elections were the Russian United Democratic Party ‘Yabloko’, whose 
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 The Altai Republic, Kaluga oblast’, Khabarovsk krai, Kurgan oblast’, Ryazan oblast’, Sverdlovsk oblast’, 
Voronezh oblast’, Yamalo-Nenets autonomous  okrug. 
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leader, Sergei Mitrokhin, voted with his family in the Moscow Duma elections only to find that when 
the results were announced for his district, no votes were recorded for Yabloko. After his complaint, 
a re-count was ordered, and the missing votes found. Mitrokhin asserted that ‘the level of 
falsifications in the October 11 Moscow City Duma elections was unprecedented in modern Russian 
history’, detailing electoral fraud and manipulation from the earliest stage of the collection of 
signatures, through ballot stuffing, a lack of ballot papers, and bussing reliable voters from district to 
district to complete absentee ballots supposedly on behalf of those who could not attend the polling 
station, to the counting itself where results were allegedly ‘corrected’ by the authorities in 
consultation with colleagues from districts across the city (Mitrokhin 2009). All of these methods of 
fraud and manipulation were likewise alleged after the December 2011 Duma elections. 
 
Types and prevalence of electoral manipulation 
[Figure One about here] 
The multi-level relationship between elections and the authorities, as detailed above, is set 
out in Figure One. To effectively analyse this relationship requires an awareness not just of the levels 
on which it operates, but also of the types and prevalence of electoral manipulation. ‘Electoral 
manipulation’ represents a broad category of behaviour, a continuum of activities from 
straightforward electoral campaigning at one end, to blatant vote-counting fraud at the other, with 
many nuances in between. Manipulation can also be categorised in terms of its relationship to 
deliberate intent, a distinction clarified by Sarah Birch as that between malpractice and mispractice, 
in other words, between the deliberate violation intended to achieve a result for personal and/or 
partisan gain, and unintended deficiencies without directed partisan ends, such as may be caused by 
poorly trained electoral officials, inadequate resources, and so on (Birch 2009: 25). From a 
comparative perspective, the definition of electoral manipulation becomes still more multi-faceted 
when cultural factors are taken into consideration. What counts as normal practice in one country – 
for example, the widespread use of absentee ballots – seems illegitimate in another (Alvarez et al. 
2008: 5). Such cultural distinctives overlap with the question of legality. One deceptively 
straightforward definition of electoral fraud is behaviour that is contrary to electoral law. This is the 
definition adopted by the chief of Russia’s Central Electoral Commission, Vladimir Churov, after the 
regional elections of October 2009, when he repeatedly challenged complainants to take accusations 
of fraud to the courts (Zakatnova 2009). However, electoral laws which militate against opposition 
parties performing well represent an habitual weapon in the armoury of electorally authoritarian 
regimes (Schedler 2009). In the case of Russia, the Central Electoral Commission’s apparently 
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laudable commitment to the rule of law is tempered when seen against Churov’s stated 
commitment to the infallibility in electoral matters of Prime Minister Putin, or when set against the 
assertion in a recent Russian book on electoral fraud that: 
‘At the moment the situation is such that electoral law in this country, as distinct from what 
happened during the time of the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies or in the Soviet years, is not 
a matter for anyone but the Central Electoral Commission. Neither the State Duma nor any other 
organ of power develops and directs electoral legislation ... not one law which doesn’t come out of 
the Central Electoral Commission has a chance of being adopted’ (Smirnov 2008: 111). 
The use of country-specific legality as a normative assessment of electoral manipulation is 
flawed. International norms, such as those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, represent more stringent criteria (Birch 2009: 
5). For the purposes of this paper, I have adapted Sarah Birch’s typology of electoral manipulation 
(Birch 2009: 26). In its original formation, this is a six-fold typology consisting of three types of 
electoral manipulation (manipulation of institutional design, manipulation of vote choice, and 
manipulation of the voting act) and a binary categorisation of legitimate / illegitimate for practices in 
each of these types of electoral manipulation. So, for example, in relation to manipulation of voter 
choice, electoral campaigning is legitimate, and vote-buying illegitimate. The adaptations to this 
typology made in Figure Two are country-specific and move away from the binary approach of the 
original.  
In terms of country-specificity, the examples of electoral manipulation used all stem from 
analyses of electoral practice in Russia in the past few years. Specifically, they are taken from two 
recent books on the subject (Malkin and Suchkov 2008, Smirnov 2008) and a newspaper article by 
the leader of the Russian United Democratic Party ‘Yabloko’, Sergei Mitrokhin (Mitrokhin 2009). 
From this latter are drawn alleged examples of electoral manipulation during the Moscow City 
elections of October 2009. In terms of moving away from the binary approach of the original 
typology, the adaptation in Figure Two places each of the examples of electoral manipulation along a 
continuum from legitimate to illegitimate. Such placements are by necessity subjective, but 
nonetheless serve to illustrate the point that electoral manipulation comes in many forms and is a 
contingent concept in relation to factors such as degree, intent, and cultural context. 
[Figure Two about here] 
Figure Two sets out a reasonably comprehensive overview of the forms of electoral 
manipulation practised – or alleged to have been practised – in Russia in the past decade. The need 
to set up a political system which looks like a liberal democracy represents a key element of electoral 
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authoritarianism, as it has emerged over the past decade or so in particular. In this context then, the 
best manipulation is unseen, an a priori establishment of the rules of the game in such a way as to 
distort the electoral outcome in favour of the regime. Such an approach more readily retains the 
image of a democratic system than does blatant intimidation, ballot stuffing, and so on (Schedler 
2009). As Figure Two demonstrates, such a priori manipulation also has inherent ambiguity with 
regard to its legitimacy. For example, the use of what is known in Russia as ‘the administrative 
resource’ looks to some extent like the simple advantages of incumbency with which any democratic 
electoral system has to deal. If it becomes the misuse of state resources for personal and political 
gain, or moves futher into bribery or blackmail or the prevention of opposition political activity, then 
it more clearly moves to the ‘illegitimate’ end of the spectrum. However, cultural factors again 
remain in play, and can be easily missed in a comparative approach. In a country where the political 
culture has for decades been one which merged the interests of state and party, of leaders and the 
people, then the administrative resource is more readily and less controversially drawn upon by the 
regional boss. Similar interpretative elements apply to other cases of ‘almost legitimate’ 
manipulation. That the legislature makes changes to electoral legislation is legitimate. That such 
changes are made with repetitive frequency by a legislature with an overwhelming pro-regime 
majority, whose members to a large extent owe their places to a system increasingly skewed in their 
favour, dilutes that legitimacy. 
Having essayed a typology of electoral manipulation, I turn briefly to the question of 
prevalence, or – more precisely – to the trend in relation to the prevalence of electoral manipulation 
in Russia. As noted at the outset, the ‘how much?’ question of how widespread electoral 
manipulation is in Russia – particularly at the illegitimate end of the spectrum – lies beyond the 
scope and intention of this paper. The most thorough quantitative analysis available hazards a figure 
of ‘upwards of 10 million suspect or fraudulent votes’ in the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008 
and the Duma election of 2007, as well as asserting that in this latter election ‘almost certainly 
anywhere between 20 and 25 percent of United Russia’s vote was won in a way which would not 
pass muster in an established or transitional democracy’ (Myagkov et al. 2009: 137). President 
Medvedev, speaking after the regional elections of October 2009, repeated the line taken by Russia’s 
ruling regime since it came to power, in stating that ‘the results of regional elections reflect the real 
balance of political forces in the country’ (Presidential website 2009). Interpreted generously, 
Medvedev’s claim need not contradict too much with that of Myagkov et al. The widely held view 
that United Russia and the Putin-Medvedev regime remain sufficiently popular to be the genuine 
first choice of the Russian people remains consistently backed up by opinion polls – although Valerii 
Smirnov argues that these opinion poll ratings themselves merit scepticism (‘it means that four out 
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of every five people around us assert “we have such an excellent president! ...” Is that really so?’) 
and that such popularity is artificially created and maintained by media bias (Smirnov 2008: 115). 
What seems indisputable, however, is that electoral falsification in Russia has become more 
apparent in the past decade. The number of mentions of electoral falsification in the Russian press 
indicates that this is the case. Figure Three shows the average number of articles per month, in the 
comprehensive Eastview database of Russian newspapers, with the words ‘falsification’ 
(фальсификац*) and election (выбор*) together.6 A straight line drawn from the column for 1999 to 
that for 2010 illustrates the clear trend of a year-on-year increase in press discussion of electoral 
falsification. (The anomalous year of 2004 is explained by the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, with 
much of the press coverage of that event mentioning the electoral falsification which lay behind the 
anger of Ukraine’s Orange revolutionaries). Unsurprisingly, given the disputed Duma elections of 
December 2011, the figure for that year is notably higher again. 
[Figure Three about here] 
The function of elections 
This paper so far has set out an empirical account of Russia’s regional elections of October 
2009, developed a Russo-specific electoral manipulation typology, and demonstrated the increasing 
prevalence of electoral falsification in Russia by counting references to the practice in the press. All 
of the foregoing supports the contention that Russia’s political system can be categorised as 
electoral authoritarianism. Electorally authoritarian systems, although they have a number of 
possible future scenarios as discussed in our final section, stand distinct from transitional systems. 
They are not necessarily on the way to democracy – although such a future turn is not excluded – 
but rather they merit conceptualisation as they now exist. Such a conceptualisation deserves 
emphasis in Russia in particular, where the regime’s narrative remains one of democratic transition, 
hampered only by the ‘deeply rooted traditions’ of the Russian state (Medvedev 2008a). As I have 
argued elsewhere, the transition approach, for all its insight in the past, has become ‘less 
appropriate for conceptualising today’s relatively stable regime’ in Russia (Bacon et al. 2006: 7). In 
short, to use an inelegant phrase, Russia has stopped transiting. President Medvedev’s assertion that 
‘our electoral system is still young’ (Presidential website 2009) belies the fact that it has been 
carefully developed, in the two decades since the Soviet collapse, alongside a robust emphasis, 
particularly since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, on the need for stability. When responding 
to the parliamentary démarche following the elections of October 2009, Prime Minister Putin 
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warned against the ‘Ukrainisation’ of Russia’s political life (Bratersky and Abdullaev 2010), by which 
he meant instability brought about by political uncertainty, such as that produced by democratic 
elections in Ukraine in 2009. 
The essence of an electorally authoritarian regime is that elections matter. They are, to re-
use Andreas Schedler’s term, constitutive of the regime, being central to claims of legitimacy. 
Bounded by manipulation as it is in Russia, the electoral framework of a liberal democratic system 
was at least originally established with the intention of adhering to its democratic essence. At the 
heart of the development of electoral authoritarianism in Russia lies the realisation that this 
framework can be retained, but manipulated in such a way as to keep the incumbent regime, or its 
chosen successor, in power, as has been the case in Russia for two decades. Such an approach 
maintains stability, with no need for authoritarian coups d’etat or too crude repression of 
opponents. It sits well too with the international community, as a departure from democracy can be 
convincingly denied. In such a system then, the function of elections is to keep the regime in power 
in a manner which looks democratic – there is opposition, it’s just that the opposition loses. 
Taking Schedler’s ‘chain of democratic choice’ (Schedler 2002: 39), itself drawing on Robert 
Dahl (1971), the seven elements deemed normatively necessary for a democratic electoral process 
provide a useful assessment of how Russia’s elections function. 
1. Empowerment. Elections should lead to power. In an electorally authoritarian regime this 
relationship between elections and power can be circumscribed by keeping key positions 
away from the electoral process. Russia’s regional elections are a case in point, with the 
abolition of elections to the post of head of the regional executive in 2004, leaving elections to 
regional legislatures only. 
2. Freedom of supply. In Russia the restriction of the supply of opposition parties and candidates 
has been accomplished by the introduction of formidable and detailed registration 
requirements, the minutiae of which, and their ill-defined catch-all nature, mean that 
‘transgressions of the law, witting or not, are relatively straightforward to allege or identify’ 
(Bacon et al. 2006: 104). As a result, unwanted parties and candidates have been kept off the 
ballot on the grounds that they have contravened electoral law, for example, in terms of 
gathering signatures, or declaring income. 
3. Freedom of demand. The control of the media in Russia, although not comprehensive, is 
sufficient – particularly when it comes to national television channels – to distort citizens’ 
awareness of the arguments and platforms of alternative candidates (McFaul and Stoner-
Weiss 2008: 69-70). 
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4. Inclusion. Russia enjoys universal suffrage, although turn-out rates have declined as the 
certainty of election results has increased (Smirnov 2008: 124). 
5. Insulation. The insulation of voters from the threat of coercion in order to vote their free 
preference generally exists in Russia. Occasional accusations of intimidation – particularly in 
more overtly authoritarian regions – are heard, but such is the case in more democratic 
systems too. 
6. Integrity. Once voting has been conducted, fair counting is required. A good deal of evidence, 
in this paper and elsewhere, points to falsification in this regard as playing an important role in 
electoral manipulation in Russia (Levy 2009, Myagkov et al. 2009, Mitrokhin 2009). 
7. Irreversibility. The consequence of elections should be that those elected exercise the power 
to which they are entitled. Such is broadly the case in Russia, although some would argue that 
the existence of the ‘tandem’ of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin curtailed the 
freedom of the former to exercise the full range of powers granted to Russia’s president. 
 
Party responses to electoral manipulation 
The regional elections of October 2009 usefully illuminate the different ways in which 
Russia’s parties relate to elections, depending on whether a party is oppositional, semi-oppositional, 
or part of the regime. As noted above, the overarching motivation in the election process for the 
regime, and so for the United Russia party, remains the retention of power. The process of election 
both confers legitimacy – to the extent that such legitimacy is not undermined by perceptions of 
electoral manipulation – and facilitates a degree of mobilisation and communication with the 
electorate. Taking as given the fact that United Russia and individuals with its support win elections, 
and accepting that legitimacy represents a central goal of the electoral process, the obvious question 
often asked is why then does the regime appear to engage in a level of electoral manipulation 
sufficient to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process itself? 
Three explanations suggest themselves. 
 First, the accepted notion that United Russia and the Putin-Medvedev tandem enjoy sufficient 
popularity to win an election without resorting to illegitimate manipulation is contingent, and 
stems in the first place from the control which they enjoy over the electoral system and 
beyond. That control creates and sustains their popular and media support. To let it slip risks 
revealing a tear in the fabric of the regime which can only worsen. As soon as the notion that 
the regime no longer has a political monopoly gains some credence, then serious players, at 
regional level or in business, might begin to think in terms of backing other options too. Such 
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an approach explains to some extent the consistent insistence on unity within the Putin-
Medevedev tandem, as the existence of genuine choice affecting the direction of the country 
brings with it the potential of undermining the regime.  
 Second, and related, Vladimir Putin’s fear of ‘Ukrainisation’ (Bratersky and Abdullaev 2010) 
confirms a long-standing commitment to stability as the Kremlin’s highest political goal, far 
more important than democracy (Bacon 2012). A trade-off then exists between hiding overt 
illegitimate electoral manipulation in order to enhance legitimacy, and allowing some such 
activity to be revealed in order to demonstrate the regime’s ability to control. The regional 
elections of October 2009 represented a diminution of the regime’s democratic legitimacy, in 
that they undermined the notion that Russian democracy involves free and fair elections. At 
the same time though, they reinforced the notion that the regime represents the only sure 
route to power. The reactions of the parliamentary opposition, in walking out of the Duma, 
and of the President, in making mollifying gestures, indicate that the balance in this case 
swung too far in the direction of overt manipulation.  
 Third, a structural explanation commends itself with regard to regional elections in particular; 
in October 2009, regional authorities, knowing that their positions depend for the most part 
on the President, the Prime Minister, and United Russia’s federal leadership, proved 
overcautious in ensuring the ‘correct result’ and ‘sort of overdid it’ (Itar-Tass 2009). In this 
explanation, since the Kremlin manipulates rather than micro-managing election results, it 
relies on the competence of the regional authorities in correctly reading the signals from the 
centre, and conducting elections which arrive at an appropriate result without resorting to 
overly overt fraud. 
The response of opposition parties to the degree of electoral manipulation apparent in 
Russia’s electoral system is likewise highlighted by the regional elections of October 2009.  For those 
parties with representation in the Duma – termed ‘semi-opposition’ by some observers – the 
enactment of a parliamentary démarche in particular demonstrates their nuanced relationship with 
the regime. On the one hand, taking part in the elections, although they know they have no chance 
of winning real power, brings access to the federal and local parliaments, a degree of closeness to 
the regime – as demonstrated by the President’s relatively swift meeting with these party leaders at 
their request after the disputed elections in October 2009 – and the attendant privileges which 
accompany such status. None of these factors should undermine the genuine policy differences 
which these parties have with United Russia on occasion, and indeed from the regime’s point of view 
it is an essential element of the political system’s design that ‘within system’ opposition retains a 
degree of independence in order to retain a degree of integrity. To that end, the walk out from 
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parliament served a purpose for the parties which walked out and for the regime. For the 
Communists, Just Russia and the Liberal Democrats it represented a protest not only at unfair 
elections – after all, they are hardly new – but at unfair elections going so far as to undermine the 
rules of the game. If elections are so unfair as to deny these parties almost any representation, then 
the benefits of remaining within the system disappear. For the regime, the démarche – although 
unlikely to have been a desired outcome – posed no serious threat and was easily resolved without 
giving in to any demands. At the same time, it served the purpose of enabling the regime to claim 
that a genuine opposition, prepared to stand up for its rights, existed within Russia’s electoral 
system. 
The question of why opposition parties outside the Duma engage with an electoral process 
which they see as flawed is less easy to answer. On occasion, for example before the presidential 
election which saw Medvedev come to power in 2008, such parties as the Union of Right Forces 
have called for an election boycott. Nonetheless, there remains a broad commitment to 
participation in the electoral process amongst parties such as Yabloko, Right Cause, and the Party of 
People’s Freedom ‘For Russia without Arbitrariness and Corruption’ (the latter created in December 
2010 by four leading extra-systemic opposition groups with the specific aim of gaining access to 
elections). Again, three reasons suggest themselves for such participation in a flawed process. First, 
the fact of electoral manipulation provides an opportunity for opposition to deligitimise the regime, 
as happened after the October 2009 and December 2011 elections. Drawing on elections’ centrality 
to the regime’s legitimation strategy, convincing cases of illegitimate manipulation serve to 
undermine legitimacy and increase popular discontent. Second, regional elections in particular allow 
more potential for access to power than do elections at federal level. It remains possible that such 
parties gain representation at regional level, especially if plans to reduce the threshold are 
introduced nationwide. The third reason for opposition parties which are currently outside the 
system to compete in flawed elections applies, to some extent, to the ‘within system’ opposition 
parties too. It is the notion that, not withstanding the apparent strength of the current regime, the 
possibility of regime collapse always remains, however remote it may seem. The political culture of 
contemporary Russia is shaped not just by the experience of the Soviet years, but also – and strongly 
– by the experience of the sudden collapse of the apparently impregnable Soviet state. Echoes of 
this experience can be heard in the emphatic commitment to stability of the Putin-Medvedev 
regime, and remain too in the commitment of opposition forces to stay in the game, holding their 






However remote, the possibility of regime collapse remains one of several potential future 
pathways for the development of Russia’s political system. A further three broad future pathways 
for Russia’s political system remain possible. First, a continuation of the current system of electoral 
authoritarianism. For all the regime’s avowed commitment to stability, a number of potential 
destabilising factors exist in electorally authoritarian systems. As the démarche of 2009 
demonstrated, the balance between acquiescence and protest on the part of opposition parties is 
delicate. Former Soviet president Mikahail Gorbachev noted that ‘if even such disciplined, cautious 
people, who are so close to power, decided to issue a démarche, that means confidence in the 
political institution of elections is completely lost’ (Gorbachev 2009). Elections without real 
substance undermine too their function as a means of communication between rulers and people. A 
poll for the Levada polling agency showed that only 28 per cent of respondents even knew that 
elections had been held in their regions in October 2009 (Interfax News Agency 2009). Too blatant 
illegitimate manipulation may also lead to the sort of street protests which encapsulate Prime 
Minister Putin’s fear of ‘Ukrainisation’. This is what occurred in Moscow in December 2011. At this 
juncture a further broad pathway for the development of Russia’s political system – a more overtly 
authoritarian turn – also becomes an option, though to take that route and abandon even a formal 
commitment to democracy is not an option that the current regime has so far seemed ready to 
choose. 
President Medvedev opted, at the State Council meeting of January 2010, to address 
opposition complaints about the October 2009 elections in the broader context of the development 
of the political system. Little of substance came from the State Council and the regional elections of 
March 2010 produced results in line with Medvedev’s stated desire that regional legislatures should 
have members from more than two parties. But what of the longer term? President Medvedev has 
written of his hopes for a political system which will be: 
‘extremely open, flexible, and internally complex ... As in the majority of democratic states, 
the leaders in the political struggle will be parliamentary parties that periodically replace 
each other in power. Parties and coalitions will form the federal and regional organs of 
executive power (not the other way around) and nominate candidates for the post of head 
of state and regional and local government leaders. They will have long experience of 
civilized political competition. And of responsible and meaningful interaction with voters, of 
interparty cooperation ... The political system will be updated and improved in the course of 
free competition among open political associations’ (Medvedev 2009) 
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Medvedev’s long-term vision represents a final possible future pathway for Russia’s political 
system – namely a return to an active transition to democracy. Such a pathway is less likely to be 
taken in the short term, but were it eventually to be essayed, then the persistence with the electoral 
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